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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses inference for rational expectations models estimated via minimum distance methods
by characterizing the probability beliefs regarding the data generating process (DGP) that are compatible
with given moment conditions. The null hypothesis is taken to be rational expectations and the alternative
hypothesis to be distorted beliefs. This distorted beliefs alternative is analyzed from the perspective
of a hypothetical semiparametric Bayesian who believes the model and uses it to learn about the DGP.
This interpretation provides a different perspective on estimates, test statistics, and confidence regions
in large samples, particularly regarding the economic significance of rejections in rational expectations
models.
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1.  Introduction 
A somewhat longer version of the following question appeared on the finance field exam 
at Columbia in 1991:  Consider the excess return on a market index  mt ft RR − .  How would you 
test the null hypothesis that  mt ft t-1 E[R R |I ] 0 − =  by examining p sample moment conditions 
() Tt t m t f t t - 1 t - 1 t - 1 t
1
T g g ; g R R z ; z I == − ∈ ∑  for some conditioning information set It–1?  Suppose 
it is certain that  mt ft t-1 E[R R |I ] 0 −= .  How would you interpret large values of the test statistic?
1 
The answer is deceptively simple. The null hypothesis can be tested with the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) overidentifying restrictions test statistic 
12
TT T Tg S g (p) χ
− ′ →  where 
Tt t t
1
T Sg g ′ = ∑ ; see Hansen (1982).  Now if the null model  tt - 1 E[g |I ] 0 =  is a maintained 
hypothesis, rational expectations becomes the null hypothesis and the alternative is then that 
expectations were not rational. Even if  T g  reliably differed from zero in a statistical sense, there 
might be beliefs implicit in a rejection region that seem plausible given the historical record.  
This possibility of assessing the economic significance of statistical rejections makes the 
distorted beliefs alternative a natural one in rational expectations models.   
The distorted beliefs alternative arises when an econometrician specifies an economic 
model of the relations among a set of observables xt of the form 
00 Pt P E[ g ( x , ) ] 0 θ = , where 
0 P θ  is 
an unknown parameter vector and P0 is the data generating process if expectations are rational 
and the model is correct.  The econometrician estimates P0 using minimum distance methods via 
P
ˆ inf |P P| −  where |•| is a measure of the distance between the empirical distribution  ˆ P and P, 
which satisfies the a priori moment restrictions.  What is missing is the link between the 
econometrician’s estimate and other ex post beliefs that might seem plausible. 
                                                 
1 Unsurprisingly, nobody ever answers the questions I put on field exams.   2
This gap is closed by supposing the econometrician asks the following question:  what 
beliefs might a hypothetical expected utility maximizer have after looking at the same data?  The 
answer is not entirely straightforward because a semiparametric Bayesian would need to specify 
priors over the space of probability measures that satisfy  Pt P E[ g ( x, ) ] 0 θ = .  The circumstances 
in which the archetype’s beliefs would converge to those of the econometrician can be quite 
delicate because a prior that places too little mass in the neighborhood of P0 or too much outside 
of such neighborhoods can lead to inconsistent posteriors.  Fortunately, there are weak sufficient 
conditions under which the archetype’s beliefs will converge to those of the econometrician.   
This paper is related to the extensive literature on empirical likelihood and related 
minimum divergence estimators; see Owen (2001) and Kitamura (2006) for recent surveys.  It is 
most closely related to Back and Brown (1992,1993), who discuss GMM estimation of 
probability distributions, and to Zellner (1994,1997), Kim (2002), Lazar (2003), and Schennach 
(2005), who discuss Bayesian inference in GMM settings.  However, the paper is almost 
orthogonal to the latter, in which probabilities are nuisance parameters and interest centers on 
inference for θ.  Here probability measures are not nuisance parameters to be profiled or 
integrated out but rather are the focus of the analysis.   
The paper is laid out as follows.  The next section describes the a posteriori beliefs of a 
hypothetical semiparametric Bayesian and discusses circumstances in which they will converge 
to the probability measure estimated by a GMM econometrician.  The penultimate section 
suggests some of the ways in which this insight can inform the interpretation of estimates, test 
statistics, and confidence regions in large samples.  A brief conclusion rounds out the paper. 
2.  A Portrait of a Semiparametric Bayesian 
This section constructs a semiparametric Bayesian archetype – one who believes in a   3
model comprised of moment conditions with otherwise general preferences and constraints – 
with a view to finding weak sufficient conditions under which posterior beliefs converge to the 
corresponding probability model estimated by a GMM econometrician.  After setting the stage in 
Section 2A, Section 2B shows that the archetype will want beliefs that converge weakly and why 
convergence can obtain with relatively unrestricted priors in an iid setting.  Section 2C proves 
that convergence still obtains on the subspace of discrete measures and 2D discusses the 
corresponding subspace for the GMM econometrician, which differs only in that each discrete 
approximation satisfies the moment conditions.  This seemingly trivial modification results in a 
very simple structure that provides insight into the distorted beliefs alternative. 
A. Preliminaries 
  To fix the setting, let x be a random variable taking values on a sample space 
d ⊆   X , let 
X B  be the Borel σ-algebra of X , and let 
q
j g(x, ) {g : Θ    Θ ,j p } θθ = ∈× → ∀ ∈ ⊂ ≤    FX , 
where  F  is the space of all bounded real-valued uniformly continuous functions.  Let 
θ P  be a 
nonempty set of probability measures P on ( , ) X XB  that satisfy  PP E[ g ( x , ) ] 0 θ = , where 
() PP rank E [g (x, )] p θ θ =  and  Pt P E[ g ( x, ) ] 0 θθ θ = ⇒=  since θ can differ across 
θ P .  Since X  is 
a complete separable metric space, 
θ P  is metrizable and can be equipped with its Borel 
σ-algebra  θ P B ; see Theorem 6.2 of Parthasarathy (1967).  Finally, let P
0 denote the measure 
governing the realizations of x and 
0 P θ  its associated parameter value.
2  To avoid the notational 
clutter associated with atoms and P-continuity sets, each P
θ ∈P  is taken to be dominated by a 
                                                 
2 Some Bayesians prefer to think of P
0 as being drawn randomly from P
θ .  Alternatively, one can view the analysis 
as conditional on P
0 being true under the null with the understanding that there can be a separate modeling exercise 
under the alternative hypothesis.  On this interpretation, the semiparametric Bayesian would possess priors over this 
model class and assign the remaining prior probability to all remaining model classes.  This Bayesian would view P
0 
as the measure that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between it and the truth under the alternative.   4
σ-finite measure μ with density given by the Radon-Nikodym derivative p = dP/dμ.  
B.  On the Beliefs of a Semiparametric Bayesian 
  The hypothetical semiparametric Bayesian is taken to maximize expected utility (or to 
minimize expected expenditure or cost for a given level of utility or production) taking account 
of the uncertainty in both the random variables that impinge on this maximum problem and the 
probability law generating them.  Many such problems can be cast in the following form: 
  A1:  The archetype chooses actions 
k a∈⊆   A  to maximize the conditional expectation 
of a bounded utility function V: { } × →∪ − ∞   XA , where V is upper semicontinuous for 
almost all x∈X , based on the information in the sub-σ-algebra  ⊂ X B F .   
A2:  The archetype formulates a prior Π(P) which satisfies  Π(dP) 1
θ = ∫P  where the 
propriety of the prior ensures that integrals over 
θ P  converge.  
In these circumstances, the Bayesian archetype will solve the maximum problem: 
P
aa
supE [V(x,a)| ] sup V(x,a)P(dx | ) V(x,a) P(dx | )Π(dP| )
θ
∈∈
== ∫∫ ∫ XX P AA
F FF F  (1) 
where  Π(P| ) F  is the posterior probability that P = P
0 and P(dx| ) F  is the predictive 
distribution for the next realization of x.
3 
  Something definitive can be said about predictive and posterior distribution asymptotics 
under two additional assumptions, one about the measures in 
θ P  and one about priors over 
θ P . 
A3:  Each 
iid 0
t x~ P and there is a random sample X
T = {x1, x2,…, xT} with 
T
T X = F .
4 
Given A3, the predictive distribution given X
T is given by: 
                                                 
3 As is readily apparent, additional random variables 
m y∈⊆   Y  can impinge on the stochastic program as long as 
they can be integrated out.  This would be the case if x is taken to be weakly exogenous with respect to y in the 
language of Engle et al. (1983) and if the prior distribution is constructed to insure that the conditional distributions 
P(y|x,F) are conditionally independent of the distributions P(x|F) in 
θ P  both a priori and a posteriori. 
4 T
T X = F  can be replaced with 
T
T X ∈ F , which would make 
TT
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where independence is only used in the passage from the first line to the second.
5 
A4.  (Schwartz (1965)):  The prior of the archetype satisfies 
0 Π K( P) 0 ε ε ⎡⎤ ∀> ⎣⎦ where 
{ } K( P ) Q :  p l n ( p / q ) d ε μ ε =< ∫ .
6 
Note that the archetype’s prior is defined over 
θ P , not over θ and a nuisance parameter 
that defines the measures compatible with the moment conditions for each θ.  In contrast to most 
semiparametric settings where interest centers on θ and not on nuisance parameters like 
probabilities, the archetype is interested in the model only for forecasting and, hence, would 
naturally form priors over probability measures, not parameter values.
7 
A1 – A4 suffice for weak convergence of the posterior and predictive distributions for P. 
Theorem 1 (Theorem 6.1 of Schwartz (1965) and Theorem 4.4.2 of Ghosh and 
Ramamoorthi (2003):  Let U be any weak neighborhood of P
0 and let 
c U\ U
θ = P . Under 
assumptions A1 – A4, 
cT 0 Π(U |X ) 0 a.s. P → . 
The idea of the proof is as follows.  The posterior probability that P is in U
c is given by: 
                                                 
5 This serves to make it clear that there is nothing in the Bayesian calculus that makes it difficult to accommodate 
heterogeneity and dependence.  The difficulty lies in the curse of dimensionality, the need to replace p(xt) with 















T Λ(X ) is the likelihood ratio statistic for the hypothesis that 
iid
t x~ P .  Heterogeneity and dependence can be 
integrated out if Λ() •  is distributed independently of p(•) both a priori and a posteriori.  The elucidation of the 
circumstances in which P
θ  has the required structure is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 Kε(P) is termed a Kullback-Leibler neighborhood of P and A4 is taken to mean that P
0 is in the Kullback-Leibler 
support of the prior. 
7In addition, priors over probability measures are invariant with respect to reparameterizations of the form  f( ) φ θ = .    6
()











The denominator can be shown to go to infinity when A4 holds and the numerator can be shown 
to converge to zero at an exponential rate because the likelihood ratio statistic for testing the null 
P = P
0 against the alternative hypothesis that P∈U
c is uniformly consistent. 
Theorem 2 (Proposition 4.2.1 of Ghosh and Ramamoorthi (2003)):  Under the conditions 
of Theorem 1, 
T0
T1 T1 P(x |X ) P (x ) ++ ⇒  a.s. P
0, where ⇒ denotes weak convergence. 
The essence of the proof is that  ( ) ()
T0 0 T PΠ PX Π(dP) P P P Π PX Π(dP)
θθ −≤ − ∫∫ PP  
by Jensen’s inequality and the right hand side converges to zero. 
How is weak convergence of the predictive distribution relevant to the Bayesian 
archetype?  A partial answer is given by the following theorem. 
Theorem 3 (Propositions 2.6–2.14 of Berger and Salinetti (1995); Theorem 1 of Zervos 
(1999)):  Suppose that V satisfies A1 and let PN be any sequence for which 
0




sup V(x,a)P (dx) sup V(x,a)P (dx) a.s.
∈∈
→ ∫∫ XX AA
 (4) 
Theorem 2 of Zervos (1999) obtains this result under less restrictive conditions than A1. 
Theorem 3 suggests that the relevance of the weak convergence criterion depends on the 
use to which the predictive distribution is being put.  If the purpose is to learn P
0 with high 
posterior probability, weak convergence is too weak:  distributions in weak neighborhoods of P
0 
can look quite different from it.  Dramatic examples can be found in Freedman (1963, 1965), 
Freedman and Diaconis (1983, 1986a,b), and Stinchcombe (2004).
8  Measures in 
θ P  that are 
                                                 
8 The fact that posterior convergence can fail even if the prior assigns positive mass to weak neighborhoods of P
0 led 
Freedman (1965) to conclude that “for essentially any pair of Bayesians, each thinks the other is crazy” and 
Stinchcombe (2004) to say that such Bayesians engage in “erratic, wildly inconsistent, fickle, or faddish” behavior.   7
close to P
0 in the Prohorov, dual bounded Lipshitz, or other weak metric can be far from P
0 in a 
Kullback-Leibler sense and relative entropy is what is relevant for likelihood ratios. 
However, this semiparametric Bayesian is using the model to solve a problem like (4).  
By the Portmanteau Theorem (Theorem 6.1 of Parthasarathy (1967) and Theorem 11.1.1 of 
Dudley (1989)), weak convergence implies that  N dP dP   ff f →∀ ∈ ∫∫ F .  If  N gdP gdP 0 →= ∫∫  
and  aN a Vd P Vd P 0 →= ∫∫ , where Va is the set of Euler equations from (4), the archetype will 
learn the optimal decision rule asymptotically.  To be sure, the archetype’s prior might reflect a 
priori beliefs about other aspects of the measures in 
θ P , particularly with respect to their 
smoothness, but the archetype would want to ensure that the resultant prior would not interfere 
with weak convergence to the optimal decision rule. Achieving weak convergence when possible 
would appear to be a minimal condition for an inductive learning scheme to be deemed rational. 
Moreover, the proviso that  N dP dP   ff f →∀ ∈ ∫∫ F  is surely relevant for the 
econometrician as well.  The econometrician is assuming that the semiparametric Bayesian is 
solving an optimization problem based on beliefs codified in the moment conditions but is 
making no assumptions regarding the functional form of the archetype’s preferences.  Consistent 
estimation of the probability measure by the econometrician is asymptotically equivalent to 
learning aspects of the beliefs of this semiparametric Bayesian that are relevant for optimal 
decisions irrespective of the specifics of the utility function in these circumstances.   
C.  Multinomial Approximation of Semiparametric Bayesian Beliefs 
The weak topology is appropriate when interest centers on probability measures or 
distributions, not on probability densities; that is, weak convergence is equivalent to 
N N lim P ( ) P( )
→∞ = AA  for all Borel sets A that have boundaries with P-measure zero and the natural   8
collection of Borel sets to contemplate is the partition of X  induced by sampling.  The fact that 
the predictive distribution converges weakly to the associated countable cell multinomial links 
the asymptotic beliefs of the semiparametric Bayesian archetype to the probability measures 
estimated by the GMM econometrician.
9  The purpose of this subsection is to make some 
connections that will prove useful in the sequel.   
As is well-known, the set of discrete measures is dense in the space of all Borel 
probability measures on X ; see, for example, Theorem 6.3 of Parthasarathy (1967) and Lemma 
11.7.3 of Dudley (1989).  A sequence of multinomial approximations can be constructed in the 







;  sup y z    n;     m n
N ∈




XX X X  (5) 
where  •  is the usual Euclidean metric.  For each n, choose any 
NN
nn x ∈    X  and set 
NN
nn P(x ) P( ) =    X  so that  N
n
N
Nn x n PP ( x ) =∑ δ   , where  N
n x δ  is the Dirac measure at 
N
n x , and the 
corresponding probability distribution is  N
n
N
Nn xx n F( x ) P ( x) 1
< =∑   .  The error in approximating 
any   f ∈F on 
N
n   X  by 
N
n (x ) f    is at most 
NNN
nnn s u p ( |) i n f ( |) ζ ff =−    XX .  Weak convergence 




dP dP sup 0 ff ζ − ≤→ ∫∫    as N→∞. 
The likelihood for each PN is given by 
N xtn
1 TN
Nn tn P( X) P ( )
∈ =∏∏
X 
  X .  If, in addition, 
NT   , each set 
N
n   X  will contain at most one observation from X
T.  Letting 
N
nt   X  denote the cell 
with 
N
tn x ∈   X , 
TN
Nn t tT P( X) P ( )
≤ =∏   X .  Thus the posterior and predictive distributions can be 
approximated on (5) by: 
                                                 
9 Chamberlain (1987) used multinomial approximation to study semiparametric efficiency but not on the weak 
topology, forming a neighborhood base for P
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P( )Π(dP)

















XX   X
 (6) 
with convergence following from the Portmanteau Theorem and Theorems 1 and 2, respectively.
10  
For comparability with the GMM econometrician, it makes sense to consolidate the 
countable partition (5) into a smaller set of partitions centered on the observations in the sample 
X
T.  To be concrete, aggregate (5) into an ‘asymptotic’ Voronoi tessellation: 
{ }
TT T N N N
tttt n n t n s tn ;  x ;   :   xx xx    n ,  s t =∈ = − ≤ − ∀ ≠ ∪∪      XX XX X  (7) 
for sufficiently large N.
11  The associated multinomial probabilities over (7) can be taken to be 
TN
Nt n t P( ) P ( ) = X   X .  Alternatively, the semiparametric Bayesian can group within cells and set 
()
TNN
Nt n n n n P( ) P P ( ) == ∑ ∪ X    XX  for all 
N
n X  allocated to 
T
t X .
12  Either way, 
T
Nt tT P( )
≤ ∏ X  is 
an approximate likelihood function for each P
θ ∈P  and the aggregated multinomial probabilities 
live on the associated standard T-simplex { }
NT T
TN t N t t :  P( ) 0 ,   P( ) 1 >= ∑ S XX .   







TT T T 0
N T1 t T1 t N T1
P( ) Π(dP)
Π PX Π PX
P( ) Π(dP)

















X  (8) 
which converge weakly as well.  It could be that (6) and (8) approximate their continuous 
analogues.  It could be that the semiparametric Bayesian approximates the “true” posterior in this 
                                                 
10 See also Theorem 4.1 of Diaconis and Freedman (1986b) for a related multinomial approximation in a Bayesian 
context based on discretization of both the sample space and the space of probability measures. 
11 This is not a standard Voronoi tessellation.  The word “asymptotic’ and the large N requirement arise because 
each 
N
n   X  is allocated to only one 
T
t X and there will be points in 
N
n X  closer to some other 
T
s X  because the diameter 
of 
N
n   X  is 1/N.  When N is large, any such tie-breaking rule will suffice. 
12 Grouping is a coarse way of smoothing but is consistent with multinomial approximation.   10
fashion.  In either case, the archetype consistently estimates the probability measure of xt. 
D.  Multinomial Approximation and the GMM Econometrician 
Now consider a second set of T-cell multinomial distributions on (7) given by 
{ }
GT T T
Tt t t t tT tT :   P() 0 ,  P() 1 ,  P() g ( x,) 0 ,   Θ θθθ θ θ
≤≤ >= = ∈ ∑∑ S , where the requirement that the 
moment conditions hold for each T makes 
N
T S  differ from 
G
T S .  However, 
NG
TT ⇒ SS  – that is, 
TT
Nt tP P( ) P( )    P ⇒∀ ∈
θ θ X P  – as the cell diameters shrink to zero.  This is the large sample link 
between probability models of the archetype and the GMM econometrician.
13 
  There is a very simple theorem that provides considerable insight into the structure of 
G
T S .  Let  Tt tT
1
T g() g ( x,) θθ
≤ = ∑  and  Tt T t T tT
1
T V ( ) [g(x , ) g ( )][g(x , ) g ( )] θθ θ θ θ
≤ ′ =− − ∑ .  Then: 
Theorem 4: Let 
G
T () θ S  be the subset of 
G
T S  for a given  Θ θ∈ .  Then each 
TT T G




tT T t T t
2 T1 2 2 2





P() g() V()[ g ( x ,) g() ] ( P )
P() g() V()g() T ( P ) ;  ( P ) ( P ) εε
θθ θ θ θ ε




′ =− − +
′ −= + = ∑∑
 (9) 
where the residuals satisfy 
1
TT t T t
T1 1
TT g() V()[ g() g() ] ( P ) θθ θ θ ε
− − ′ <− − <  so that 
T
t P() 0 θ > .
14 
Proof:  Trivial application of the normal equations of multiple regression with an 
intercept. 
This is an arithmetic result:  all multinomial probabilities based on the same value of θ 
                                                 
13 A discrete prior can be formed over the T-simplex 
G
T S  (or, for that matter, on the N-simplex over (5) constrained 
to satisfy the moment conditions).  
G
T Diam( ) 2 ≤ S  but the probabilities are O(T
-1) and so 
G
T Diam( ) = S O(√T), 
bounding 
G
T S  by the positive orthants of spheres of the form 
21
t tp O(T )
− = ∑ . Letting  ( )
2
tt t Hx , y (x y ) =√ − √ ∑  
be the squared Hellinger metric, 
G
T S  can be covered by  ( )
N2 T T
mk m {P : H P ,P 0   k m, m 1 , ,M} δ ≥>∀≠ = …  and an 
approximate prior is given by 
TT
Tm m m () P δ Π=Π ∑  where 
T
m 0 Π >  and 
T
m m 1 Π = ∑ .  T() δ Π  satisfies A4 because the 
Hellinger distance bounds relative entropy.  See Ghosh and Ramamoorthi (2003) for a version of  T() δ Π  with a 
prior over a random number of cells.  See also Schennach (2005). 
14 The awkward notation  t(P) ε  arises because there will generally be many P∈P
θ  for each value of θ.   11




TT g() V()[ g() g() ] θθ θ θ
− ′ −− , termed implied probabilities by 
Back and Brown (1993), where the residuals  t(P) ε  are identically zero if the implied probabilities 
are all positive.  In large samples, 
1
TT t T p g() V()[ g () g() ] o( 1 ) θθ θ θ
− ′ −=  for values of θ  in 
shrinking neighborhoods of  0 P θ . For such values of θ  and for P in shrinking neighborhoods of  
P
0, nonzero values of  t(P) ε  are a small sample event because  00 t PP E[ g ( x , ) ]0 θ = .  The fact that 
(9) holds for any numbers { } tt t t tt p:  p 1 , p g 0 = = ∑∑  – that is, pt need not be positive – 
suggests that this regression structure can be useful for interpreting their sample analogues.
15 
  The regression sum of squares can be interpreted along similar lines.  The sum of squared 
differences between 
T
t P() θ  and 1/T is proportional to what Owen (1991) termed Euclidean 
likelihood.  In large samples, it is proportional to the φ- or f-divergences introduced by Csiszár 
(1967), making for a connection with a rich literature on estimation and testing based on the 
minimization of empirical divergences.  These divergences are defined by the discrepancy 
functions 
p
q () ( z ) 0 φφ ≡>  where p and q are two densities defined on the same sample space and 
where φ(•) is continuous, convex, and twice differentiable and normalized so that  (1) (1) 0 φφ ′ ==  
and (1) 1 φ′′ = .  The term discrepancy serves as a reminder that φ(•) need not possess either the 
symmetry or triangle inequality properties of a metric.
16   
The scaled divergence between discrete measures with probabilities pt and qt is measured 
by   Tq t t t D( z ) 2 E[( z ) ] 2 q ( z)
φ φφ == ∑  and a Taylor series expansion yields: 
                                                 
15 The regression structure of multinomial probabilities can also be used in prior construction if the zero covariance 
between  t g( ) θ  and  t(P) ε  is strengthened to  tt E[ (P) |g(x , )] 0 = ε θ . 
16 The smoothness assumption rules out weak metrics such as the Kolmogorov, Levy, Prohorov, and dual bounded 
Lipschitz; Donoho and Liu (1988) discuss how such metrics can produce poorly behaved minimum distance 
estimates.  It contains the convex members of the Cressie-Read (1988) power divergence family for which φ(z) is an 
affine function of z
α including the likelihood divergence, entropy or Kullback-Leibler information, the Hellinger 
metric, and Pearson’s and Neyman’s modified χ
2.   12
2
Tt t t t t t tn
22
tt t t t tt
1
D (z) 2 q (z ) 2 q [ (1) (1)(z 1) ( )(z 1) ]
2
q ( z1 ) q [ ( ) 1 ] ( z1 )
φ φφ φφ ξ
φξ
′′ ′ ==+ − + −




where  t ξ is between 1 and zt.  When 
T
tt pP ( ) θ =  and  t
1
T q = , (10) takes the form: 
22 TT
Tt t t tt
11
TT D( z ) T P() T [ ( ) 1 ]P()
φ θφ ξ θ ′′ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− +− − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑∑  (11) 
for all 
G




T sup P ( ) o (1) θ −=  and if φ″(z) is bounded in the neighborhood of 
unity, the second term in (11) converges to zero uniformly.  The leading term is proportional to 
Pearson’s χ
2 divergence, which suggests that the decomposition of the regression sum of squares 
in the second line of (9) can provide insight into sample analogues as well. 
3.  The Distorted Beliefs Interpretation of Hypothesis Tests and Confidence Regions 
Section 2 provided a framework for interpreting estimates of a probability measure that 
satisfies given moment conditions along the lines of Back and Brown (1992).  Confronting 
uncertainty in the form of random variables 
iid 0
t x~ P, a generic expected utility maximizer forms a 
prior distribution over 
θ P  because this semiparametric Bayesian believes 
0 P
θ ∈P .  In this 
setting, the archetype’s predictive distribution converges weakly to P
0 when 
0 P
θ ∈P  under the 
sole condition that the prior assigns positive probability to all Kullback-Leibler neighborhoods of 
P
0.  Moreover, discrete approximations to the predictive distribution converge weakly as well 
and, as a consequence, converge to the GMM estimate of P
0.  The restrictions on the preferences 
and prior beliefs of this hypothetical semiparametric Bayesian would appear to be quite weak. 
However, the archetype is a construct, a hypothetical Bayesian econometrician looking at 
the same data as the GMM econometrician.  It is the large sample connection between the two 
that forms the framework proposed here:  the notion that 
N
T
θ ↑ SP  and that 
NG
TT ⇒ SS .  One way 
to exploit this insight is to actually do the work of the semiparametric Bayesian and replicate the   13
multinomial construction in 2C on (5) or (7) or on some other appropriate partition of the sample 
space. Such an analysis would require much more than the characterizations in 2B and 2C; it 
would necessitate formulating priors that satisfied Assumption A4 (or some analogue of it) 
without placing additional substantive restrictions.  While it is possible to do so along the lines of 
footnotes 13 and 15, this sort of analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
This section is devoted to a discussion of the alternative hypothesis that motivated the 
paper:  that plausible differences between the a posteriori beliefs of a hypothetical 
semiparametric Bayesian and a GMM econometrician can inform estimation and inference in 
GMM settings.  The next subsection provides a distorted beliefs interpretation of confidence 
regions and goodness-of-fit statistics based on the regression sum of squares in (9).  The final 
subsection discusses some of the uses of the corresponding residuals. 
A.  Test Statistics and Confidence Regions 
Let  { }
{}
T
TT t T T
,{P( ),t T}





θθ  and note that  T ˆ TD(z )
φ  is given by: 
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(12) 
where the second line involves the substitution of (9) into (12) and the convergence to a  χ
2(p–q) 
random variable obtains if the moment conditions are valid because  tp 1o ( 1 ) ξ =+  and 
T
32 T
tp ˆ T( P ) o ( 1 ) ε σ = .  Hence,  T ˆ TD(z )
φ  differs from the GMM overidentifying restrictions test 
statistic in the presence of these two op(1) terms and in the choice of estimator and covariance 
matrix – 
1
TT T a r g m i n g() S() g()
θ
θθ θ
− ′    instead of  T ˆφ θ  and  TT tT tT tT
1
T S( ) g ( x, ) g ( x, ) θθ θ
≤ ′ = ∑       in 
place of  TT ˆ V( )
φ θ , where  T θ    is any √T consistent estimator of θ.   14
  This large sample χ
2 test statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis and to construct 
confidence regions for θ under the null.  Conventional practice is to select a significance level α 
and an associated critical value c
α that solves 
2
pq Pr( c )
α χα − ≥= .  The null hypothesis is rejected 
if  T ˆ TD(z ) c >
φα  while the statistic fails to reject the null if  T ˆ TD(z ) c ≤
φα .  As is typically the case 
in likelihood-based inference, the rejection region can be viewed as the complement of the 1–α 
per cent confidence region given by { }
T
tT ,{P ( ),t T}: TD(z ) c ≤≤
φα θθ .
17 
  The link between 
N
T S  and 
G
T S  provides for an economic interpretation of rejections in 
this inference framework.  The rejection region { }
TG
tT T ˆ {P ( ),t T} :  TD(z ) c ≤∈ >
φα θ S  is a subset 
of the T-cell multinomials in 
G
T S  and 
NG
TT ⇒ SS .  The question at hand is simple:  are there 
beliefs implicit in the rejection region that the econometrician would think that the archetype 
might reasonably possess a posteriori?  Put differently, might the beliefs of such a Bayesian 
make a seemingly sharp rejection appear instead to be compatible with the data?  Might there be 
plausible beliefs outside the associated 1–α per cent confidence region? 
This then is the main point of the paper.  If the answer to these questions is “yes,” the 
econometrician could reasonably declare that the test statistic provided a statistically significant 
rejection at level α that should be thought of as economically insignificant.  A similar statement 
applies to economically plausible beliefs that lie outside the confidence region that is the 
complement of the rejection region.  An econometrician who did not want to draw sharp 
conclusions about economic as opposed to statistical significance could simply report summary 
                                                 
17 The empirical likelihood ratio statistic – that is,  T ˆ TD(z )
φ  with φ(z) = ln(z) – is Bartlett correctable; see Chen and 
Cui (2006) for the moment condition version of this result.  Its mean is 
log 1 2
Tc ˆ E{TD(z )} q(1 B T ) O(T )
−− =+ +  in large 
samples and the Bartlett correction takes the form 
log 1 2
Tc ˆ ˆ Pr[TD(z ) c (1 B T )] O(T )
α α
−− ≤+ = + , where  c ˆ B  can be 
obtained from the bootstrap.  There is a subtle issue here; the prior also influences second order inference in this 
setting.  Under suitable regularity conditions, the Bartlett-corrected empirical likelihood rejection region would be 
the appropriate object of inference if the prior was sufficiently flat in the neighborhood of the optimum.   15
statistics describing the beliefs that seem to be sufficiently compatible with the data. 





ˆ ˆ lnP ( ) ln
φ θ − ∑  based on the estimate  T ˆφ θ  with that of a distribution that is more easily 
interpreted.  McCulloch (1989) suggested one such calibration:  compare the sample relative 
entropy with that from a hypothetical binomial experiment in which the null success probability 





ˆ ˆ lnP ( ) ½[ln½ ln(1 q)] ½[ln½ lnq] ½ln½ ½ln[q(1 q)] ln
φ θ =− − +− = − − − ∑  (13) 
The presumption is that values of q close to ½ suggest that a sample entropy that is statistically 
significant at level α is small in this alternative metric.   
A similar calibration can be based on the multivariate normal distribution for which the 
entropy is  d





ˆ ˆ lnP ( ) ln2 e ln | |
≤ =+ ∑ ∑
φ θπ (14) 
can be solved for | | ∑ , which, in turn, can be compared with the restricted estimate  ˆ || ∑  from: 
T
tT t t tT
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ P( ) ( x ) ( x )
φ θμ μ




ˆ ˆ ˆ P( ) x
φ μθ
≤ =∑  is the restricted estimate of the mean.  Here, too, sufficiently small 
differences between || ∑  and  ˆ || ∑  suggest that the difference between the two is “reasonably 
small” in this alternative metric.   
B.  Residual Analysis 
Reasonable a posteriori probability beliefs can be assessed via relations (9) and (12).  
The relative contributions of the fitted values 
1
TT TT tT TT
11
TT
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ g( ) V( )[ g ( x, ) g( ) ]
φφ φ φ θθ θ θ
− ′ −−  and the 
residuals 
T
tT ˆ ˆ ()
φ εθ are given in (9) and values of either that are large in absolute value have a   16
disproportionate impact on the 
T
tT ˆ ˆ P( )
φ θ  estimates and their associated sample entropy.  Large 
residuals may be especially informative since the residuals are identically zero if the implied 
probabilities lie between zero and one.  The incremental impact of alternative divergences can be 
examined via the observed covariance between the excess curvature  tT ˆ [( z ) ]1 ′′ −





ˆ ˆ (P ( ) ) −
φ θ  as codified in (12).
18 
The whole probability simplex 
G
T S  can be investigated in this fashion. Plausible values of 
θ might be suggested by theory or introspection or might be obtained by bootstrapping, which is 
rigorously justifiable under A3. For each θ, 
G
T () θ S  can be explored by enumerating sets of 
residuals  t(P) ε  that sum to zero, are orthogonal to  t g(x , ) θ , and satisfy the lower and upper 
bound constraints, which can then be examined with the regression diagnostics. Conditioning on 
θ is the best way to explore 
G
T S  if  tt E[ (P)g(x , )] 0 εθ =  is strengthened to  tt E[ (P)|g(x , )] 0 εθ = . 
Implicit in this discussion is a particular concern for the effect of outliers on probabilities, 
which play a special role in models that incorporate expectations.  As Back and Brown (1993) 
emphasized, outliers in this setting represent data that are not representative of the underlying 
population when the moment conditions are true.  In rational expectations models, data that are 




T P() θ −  is large – are often thought to represent 
peso problems, events that were expected to happen but that did not eventuate or that did not 
                                                 
18 There is a suggestive interpretation of alternative divergences that is hard to make rigorous without taking a stand 
on priors.  Priors generated via ex ante maximization of the expected distance, such as the Kullback-Leibler or χ
2 
divergence, between prior and posterior over the sample space are called reference or default priors; see Bernardo 
(2005) for a survey and Kuboki (1998) for an application to parametric prediction.  Maximizing this distance is 
analogous to minimizing the distance between  T P  and the true distribution P
0.  The empirical distribution 
0 ˆ PP ⇒  
and  TT ˆ ˆ P( ) P
φ θ ⇒  even under the alternative.  In this heuristic sense, cells for which  t ˆ (z ) φ  is small are ones for which 
the data dominate the prior in the distance as measured by φ(•) while those for which  t ˆ (z ) φ  is large are ones for 
which the apparent impact of the prior remains sizeable.  It is a considerable leap to go beyond these heuristics to an 
actual reference prior for semiparametric Bayesian prediction and a corresponding assessment of the impact of the 
prior in a given sample.  The ideas in footnotes 13 and 15 are one place to start.   17
occur as frequently as expected.  For example, the Great Depression might represent a recurrent 
rare event or one that will succumb to the law of large numbers.  Accordingly, we might 
reasonably expect the prior predictive probability  ( )
TT
NT 1 t T 1 t Px P ( x ) Π(dP)
θ ++ ∈= ∈ ∫P XX    – that 
is, the predictive distribution for xT+1 in the absence of sample information – for some such 
T
t X  to 
be much larger than the empirical probability  1
T , resulting in a seemingly large value of 
T
t P() θ .  
Note also that  () N P •  is the posterior predictive probability outside the convex hull of the data. 
4.  Conclusion 
  This paper was based on a simple intuition. What can we learn from probability 
statements about sample moment conditions in rational expectations models under the 
maintained hypothesis that the moment conditions are true?  The answer is straightforward:  
modulo sampling error, sample moments reflect biases in the expectations of the relevant 
economic actors in these circumstances.  This distorted beliefs alternative would appear to be an 
interesting one, if only because it provides one dimension in which to distinguish between 
economic and statistical significance.  All that is needed is a way to measure the attributes of 
expectations compatible with the moment conditions. 
  The attainment of this goal required a detour down the path of Bayesian semiparametrics.  
Models based on moment conditions do not deliver likelihoods and the strict application of the 
Bayesian calculus requires their specification.  Moreover, the formation of prior beliefs is more 
challenging in such settings because the data need not swamp the prior when priors are over 
spaces of probability measures.  Finally, the literature on priors for semiparametric models is thin 
and a broad set of priors would appear to be necessary when seeking to characterize the extent to 
which the expectations compatible with a given set of moment conditions are “nearly rational.”     18
  Two attributes of the archetypical semiparametric Bayesian constructed in Section 2 
eliminated these problems.  The first was the presumption that the archetype was a consumer of 
economic theory who used the model based on moment conditions solely for forecasting.  The 
second was the shift from densities that respect the moment conditions to discrete measures that 
do so. The resulting predictive distribution based on a countable set of multinomial 
approximations proves to be consistent under the weak restriction that the prior assigns positive 
probability to all Kullback-Leibler neighborhoods of the true distribution. While this observation 
is hardly surprising in finite-dimensional parametric settings, it is somewhat more remarkable in 
this semiparametric setting in which the typical requirement is far more stringent. 
  The result is a semiparametric Bayesian interpretation of probability estimates provided 
by empirical likelihood and related minimum divergence methods. From this perspective, 
rejection and confidence regions are comprised of probability beliefs, not parameter values, 
beliefs an econometrician can examine for their plausibility.  This association of plausible beliefs 
with such regions yields a framework for assessing the economic significance of distorted beliefs. 
  Let me conclude by suggesting three ways in which research along these lines can 
proceed.  First, it would be useful to have additional analytical tools beyond those described in 
Section 3.  Second, statistics other than omnibus goodness-of-fit tests can be examined in this 
fashion but the difference between the Bayesian and frequentist treatment of nuisance parameters 
might make it more difficult to equate the beliefs of the archetype and the GMM econometrician.  
Finally, a more interesting archetype might be one with the same objectives but whose decisions 
affect sample outcomes as is the case in rational expectations models with learning or in Kurz’s 
(1997) rational beliefs equilibria.  Here, too, it might well be substantially more challenging to 
equate the beliefs of a semiparametric Bayesian and the GMM econometrician.   19
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